Mind the gaps!:EU and the makings of robot autonomy (discussion paper) by Rommetveit, Kjetil et al.
1             This is a preprint draft copy, freely available for fair use, see  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use .
This is a discussion paper / preprint draft, based on EPINET D8.4, 2012.
Mind the gaps! EU and the makings of robot autonomy
Authors: Kjetil Rommetveit (1), Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir (2), Niels van Dijk (3), Martijntje Smits (4)
1. University of Bergen
2. Lancaster University     
3. Vrije Universiteit Brussels
4. Utrecht Universiteit, NL
Abstract:  This paper explores the entanglement of visions,  politics and innovation policy
development with recent developments in robotics. We explore the orientations to purpose
and  direction  with  which  innovations  in  robotics  are  encouraged.  We  explore  the
discrepancies between machines as reality and machines as fiction, in particular the vision of
robot autonomy as fundamental to future developments with the particular aim to help solve
Europe's  societal  problems.  We argue  that  these  complex  entanglements  are  riddled  with
contradictions and 'gaps' to be minded, i.e., between industry and academic research, between
technologists, ELS scholarship, policy and society at large and, last but not least, between
machines  of  today  and  tomorrow.  We  argue  that  the  political  and  policy  landscape  that
encourages  these  innovation  practices  and  cultivates  imaginaries  of  robot  autonomy  is
misguided (or mistaken)  in  its  purpose-driven agenda which can only exacerbate  existing
contradictions. Rather, what is at stake is a level-headed politics of uncertainty to deliver a
robotics agenda for a societal good that meets the criteria of responsible innovation.
1. Introduction: visions and politics
The European Robotics Technology Platform (EUROP) was founded by industry actors in
2005 with support from the European Commission.1 At its formal launch, the commissioner
for Information Society and Media, Viviane Reding, stated that:
…the Lisbon Strategy calls for a more competitive Europe, the only way to
sustain our unique social model…We need to achieve higher economic growth
through more innovation and higher productivity, whilst creating more jobs.
We need also to address many societal challenges, the ageing population, the
well being of our society, and the need for security…Robotics will contribute to
these challenges (Reding 2005).
Robotics  development  across  Europe  is  increasingly  coordinated  by  public-private
conglomerates of policy, industrial and academic actors. The prime mover so far has been
1 The main initiator companies being EUnited Robotics, KUKA, ABB, Phillips, FhG IPA, and KTH.
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industry because of its power to frame the premise of research and development policy in
terms that orient toward industrial production. However, the industries do not act alone in
shaping  innovative  and  radical  visions  for  the  future  of  robotics.  They  rely  on  other
communities  to  help  create  and  push  new  agendas,  including  the  academic  research
communities, policy makers, lawyers, the media and citizens more generally. Research and
development activities in recent times have brought closer together actors who shape and
strengthen a vision of how advancing robotics will contribute to ongoing efforts to promote
and cultivate European competitiveness, innovation, higher productivity and growth. It has
brought  together  actors  who strongly  promote visions  of  companion and assistive  robots,
capable of operating safely among humans in ordinary everyday environments.
EUROP  prepared  the  strategic  research  agenda  for  European  robotics,  Robotic  Visions
(EUROP,  2009),  but  in  the  year  thereafter  (2010)  the  network  merged  with  the  more
academically-oriented European Robotics Research Network (EURON) to form what is now
called euRobotics.2 This new entity has since joined in a Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
contract with the European Commission (Bischoff, et al, 2010)—a form of partnership which
strategically supports innovation domains that“are addressing major societal challenges by
strengthening Europe‘s competitive position in a particular business sector”. Consequently, a
PPP-contract with the Commission significantly strengthens the policy support to expand on
the opportunities that can bring robotics development into new and more advanced areas of
deployment, fundamental to addressing Europe's problems.
Intelligent, learning and adaptable systems are at the top of the list of opportunities in robotics
development. This is demonstrated by a wide-spread quest for scientific, industrial and legal
pathways towards robot autonomy. A consortium of academic researchers, Robot Companions
for Citizens (RCC), captures the gist of this quest as a scientific and technological challenge
that has been matched with societal challenges and concerns. The RCC manifesto outlines the
qualities  of  European  societies:  “democracy,  advanced  economies,  social  inclusion  and
quality of life are ingredients of a welfare much of the rest of the world looks up to” (RCC
2012). Then it states that European welfare is at risk due to negative demographics, man-
made and natural disasters, economic downturn, trade imbalances, and a dwindling industrial
base. The manifesto claims that there are discrepancies between the aspirations of Europeans
and the realities with which they live. The gap is branded as  the challenge of sustainable
welfare (ibid) which then is faced with the shortcomings of today’s machines in contributing
solutions to the challenges faced by European societies. “We envision of a whole new class of
machines to overcome the limitations of today’s machines, new machines based on a whole
new science” (ibid). The shortcomings are further reduced to obstacles that form what the
RCC calls the robotics bottleneck on the road to autonomous machines:
The  first  one  is  that  current  robots  are  unable  to  operate  in  real  world
conditions… no existing robot or autonomous system is capable of operating
without  sharp  boundaries  that  delimit  its  role  and protect  it  from harming
humans,  the  environment  or  itself.  The  second  is  that  for  a  traditionally
engineered system, operating in complex real world conditions would result in
high demands for energy, computation and storage (RCC 2012).
One can argue that robotics development has always been intimately connected with visions
of  autonomous  machines,  in  particular,  any human-like  intelligent  appearances  like  those
found in mythology, folklore and the science fiction genre (e.g. Hephaestus' golden assistants;
the Golem; Asimov, 2004; Pixar Animation Studios, 2008). These visions have implications
for how we understand human capabilities, human autonomy, intelligence and adaptation. As
it stands however,  the very notion of such machines remains a mechanical myth. Robotic
2 http://www.eurobotics-project.eu/about-eurobotics/euron-europ/europ-euron.html
3             This is a preprint draft copy, freely available for fair use, see  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use .
devices can imitate humans and animals to some degree and we already appropriate a range of
robotic tools and technologies as we do other types of machines and material artefacts more
generally, i.e., for purposes that demonstrate human power to control them for some purchase
in the world.
Working machines and material  artefacts  are missing the mythical  edge that characterises
visions of robot autonomy, an edge which points to contradictions in its makings. Increasing
the autonomy of machines will complicate the conditions of controllability, decrease human
control along with our understanding of such machines. At the same time the key idea is to
build intelligent,  learning and adaptable systems to better  control the development  of our
societies along the trajectories of European values and societal priorities.
In the following three sections, we will further address the shaping of EU robotics networks,
visions and strategies, the makings of robot autonomy as a topic for ongoing exploration,
perplexity and debate, and the minding of gaps in these developments. As regards the first on
this  list,  contributions  from industry,  the  scientific  research communities,  law and policy,
indicate how differently these actors imagine and position themselves within the networks
that  aim  to  advance  robotics.  There  are  ideological  differences  and  issues  of  practical
exploitation of purposes and goals,  but they are also not equally powerful and influential
when it comes to strategic planning and visionary work. For example, it is quite bluntly stated
in the 2009 strategic research agenda prepared by EUROP that,  “industry will be the main
driver  behind  these  targeted  stimulations  because  its  needs  for  innovation  and  strong
positioning  in  the  worldwide  robotics  market  are  the  greatest” (EUROP 2009).  In  other
words, European industry is vying for the strongest possible position in global markets. It
seeks  to  bend the  contributions  of  others  toward  those purposes,  while  others  also assert
themselves  independently  within  what  appears  to  be  a  highly  political  and  policy-driven
technoscape of robotics development.
As regards the second topic, the making of robot autonomy, we explore how such makings are
differently envisioned and formulated, depending on whether the vision of autonomy comes
from  within  industry,  the  scientific  research  communities  or  from  legal  scholarship.  We
explore as well how the different actors imagine and position themselves in relation to the
project (and promise) of human-like performance. Visionaries and researchers have always
portrayed  varying  degrees  of  optimism  in  this  respect,  as  the  following  two  statements
indicate:
A type of human robot, a Humanoid is expected, to work together with human
partners in our living environment, and it will share the same working space
and will  experience  the same thinking and behaviour  patterns  as  a human
being (http://www.humanoid.waseda.ac.jp/history.html).
This [human-like performance] is far beyond the current state of the art and
will remain so for many years to come. Therefore, we propose to focus research
efforts  on  a  small  set  of  strategic  challenges  required  to  make  headway
towards this vision (FET, 2006, p.3).
Robots have for decades been cut off from most of society for reasons of safety and liability.
Apart  from a number of simple household and companion-type robots on the market,  the
physical space for robotic operations is often strictly delimited using physical barriers, e.g., in
factories,  or  they  are  fitted  with  mechanisms  for  direct  human  control  in  specialised
operations. But, if the ambition is now to overcome the necessity of such barriers, the arising
challenge is that of inventing new kinds of control mechanisms, preferably ones that can be
designated  to  the  machine  itself,  meta-ethics,  as  it  becomes  more  adaptable,  flexible  and
capable of learning (see Asimov's three laws of robotics).
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The third topic concerns the 'gaps' that are articulated, explored and dealt with to some extent
in  these  developments.  There  are  gaps  between  different  techno-epistemic  regimes  that
contribute to innovation in robotics. Their visions and orientations need bridging to strengthen
the very project of building intelligent, learning and adaptive machines. They need bridging
with  visions  and  strategies  to  create  sustainable  wealth  and  welfare  in  Europe  which  is
manifested already in innovation policy and societal priorities on the political agenda. There
are gaps between machines as fact and machines as fiction which further complicates the
relationship between different contributors to robotics development,  but also relates to the
efforts  amongst  legal  scholars  to  articulate  how or in  what  sense machines  become legal
entities. We describe how different regimes mind these gaps in constructing and imagining
robot autonomy, and inscribing such a development in strategies for action whose purpose is
to address societal problems.
We argue that what is at stake here are the politics of uncertainty and contradiction, rather
than  a  straightforward  project  of  minding  gaps,  in  concerted  efforts  to  situate  robotic
autonomy against  current  threats  to  Europe's  welfare.  On the one hand,  we observe  how
visionaries  and research leaders  attempt to  bridge the gap between different  interests  and
orientations to robotics developments. They seek to strengthen the networks that contribute to
robotics  development  and strengthen the  scientific  and technological  research  in  order  to
bridge the gap between today's and tomorrow's machines. On the other hand we observe how
purpose-driven  the  politics  of  innovation  are  in  minding  the  gaps  between  European
aspirations of growth, competitiveness and sustainable welfare, and the frequently mentioned
societal  problems  of  the  day.  We  observe  attempts  to  steer  scientific  and  technological
developments in the general direction of those purposes.
1.1 . A note on method
In this paper we take stock of the scholarly orientations each author brings to this case study
and how they cut across the key arguments in complementary ways. In doing this, we utilise
ethical  and  legal  scholarship,  vision  assessment  and  socio-technical  evaluation.  We  all
examine a small set of documentary data, while exploring independently a number of other
data sources which are particularly amenable to our individual approaches. For example, we
explore the proposals for green/white papers on legal issues, mission statements and other
output from roboethicists, social-anthropological studies of AI, HCI and robotics, and case
study data from participatory design. As Ten Have explains, all such documents will always
have to be considered some form of evidence. If they do not serve as the means to access
original events, they are specimens of their own type, whereby the practices of documentation
can be studied as ways of using documents (Ten Have, 2004). In this sense, documents are
social facts. They are deliberately produced, distributed and shared in organised ways for one
or another reason (e.g.  Silverman, 2006, p.168; also Scott,  1990). They are produced and
reproduced to assist  in  some activity  and the investigator  should  thus  be sensitive  to  the
conditions of producing them, how they can `fix' certain aspects of current events and actions,
and what the conditions are for making them available, for example, how information travels
through time and space (Ten Have 2004).
We  see  knowledge  about  autonomous  robots  in  the  EU  as  constituted  through  different
practices, i.e. as acted out in different networks such as law, ethics, politics and the robotics
community itself (academe and industry). Noticing the different modalities involved in all
these  networks,  we  especially  focus  on  the  ways  in  which  knowledge  circulates  and  is
translated  between networks  of  practice.  Significantly,  whereas  most  practitioners  will,  in
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some sense or other, focus on the creation of 'autonomous robots', it is by no means given that
the concept of autonomy (or robotics for that matter) means the same within different actor
networks. Still,  while these practices keep operating according to epistemic and normative
mores, they also reflect upon the practices of others taking place. Through such reflections we
observe  the pervasiveness  of  the western techno-cultural  imaginary.  We identify  mythical
elements in the midst of techno-scientific practice, sustaining the creation and transmission of
knowledge  (ethics  -  law  -  politics  -  robotics,  etc.).  In  other  words,  the  techno-scientific
implements the hardest of artefacts along with the instrumental values of competitiveness and
growth, however, fuelled by make-believe and fascination.
2. The shaping of robotics networks 
Founding  the  technology  platform  EUROP  in  2005,  enabled  a  certain  socio-technical
imaginary of advancing robotics that opened for the involvement of other robotics developers
across  Europe  (Jasanoff  and  Kim 2009,  Levidow et  al.  2012).  Among  key  actions  were
attempts to forge a common language and a vision that could be used to direct and coordinate
pan-European and cross-sectoral activities within the robotics domain with the aim to deliver
new and innovative products to market. The drafting of the 2009 strategic research agenda
was made possible through a coordinated action project (CARE) under the 6 th framework
programme, consisting of 125 partners from different parts of the European robotics industry.3
Through a specific road mapping methodology based on working groups, consensus meetings
and expert consultations, the CARE project delivered a broad agenda, including visions and
key strategies for the whole research and development community. This agenda identifies core
market sectors of strength for European robotics:  industrial, domestic service, professional
service,  security  and space  robotics.  Within  these  sectors,  product  visions  are  further
developed  by  focusing  on  certain  market  pulls  (industry)  as  well  as  the  more  radical
technology push (academy).  Overall  however,  this  robotics  vision is  oriented towards  the
advancement of industrial production, centred on concrete applications across societal sectors,
e.g.  robotic  workers,  robotic  co-workers,  logistic  robots,  robots  for  surveillance  and
intervention, robots for exploration and inspection, and edutainment robots (EUROP, 2009: p.
13).
One can say that EUROP belongs to the industry sectors, although, the platform has largely
been  sustained  through  EU  research  grants  that  have  supported  the  ongoing  work  of
mobilising academic research communities for industrial purposes, and mobilising as well the
available  ethical,  legal  and  sociology  (ELS)  expertise  to  'clear  away  social  and  ethical
obstacles'.  Indeed, one of the key recommendations in the 2009 EUROP roadmap was to
“avoid ethical, legal and societal issues become barriers” to the further expansion of European
robotics (2009: p. 37). Part and parcel of a strategic approach to this issue was that industry
must engage with policy makers, and that public awareness should be further developed. The
main issue concerns robotics for everyday environments. If the barriers that separate robots,
society  and  the  environment  are  to  be  broken  down,  a  number  of  issues  relating  to  the
uncertainty and unpredictability of robots can be expected to arise, not the least with reference
to liability issues.
Two key outputs of ELS activities so far with funding from Supported Coordination Action
under the 7th Framework Programme: 
3 CARE is important due to its strategic role. In addition the EU funds robotics projects in a number of areas, 
such as security, health and ageing, social robotics, aeronautics and industrial robotics, as well as more basic 
research into necessary enabling technologies. When entering ”robotics” into the CORDIS project web-page 
(http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/projects/home_en.html), the page comes up with 157 projects in FP7 alone.
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1. Proposal for a Green Paper on legislating robotic technologies (Leroux,
et al, 2012) 
2. Guidelines on Regulating Robotics (Palmerini, et al, 201.4) [proposal
for a white paper]
Prior  to  these  contributions  seeing  light,  a  workshop  on  ELS  issues  was  arranged  by
euRobotics to lay out a plan of direct engagement with the legislative process:  “The […]
workshop on the ELS issues in robotics will present the current version of the Green Paper
(i.e. a forerunner of the White Paper, a consultation document with a preliminary set of ideas,
strategies and guidelines to face the identified issues) on robotics and law...” (euRobotics
Forum, 2012:  workshop description). What is unusual about this approach is that it  is not
normally  the  business  of  an  EU-funded  research  project,  in  this  case  coordinated  by  an
industry platform, to produce concrete proposals for EU legislation.4 The introduction to the
Green Paper acknowledges this anomaly in a disclaimer stating that “This document is not a
green paper stricto sensu. It constitutes a proposal for a green paper since it is not an official
EC document” (Leroux, et al, 2012). In spite of the disclaimer however, the Green Paper is
seen to foreshadow the “[w]hite Paper on Regulating Robotics, containing guidelines and
suggestions  for  the  European  Commission  in  the  field  of  regulating  emerging  robotic
technologies”.5 Taken together these contributions are expected to establish a solid framework
of 'robolaw' in Europe.
While the Green Paper mobilised lawyers, the two main authors are industry representatives
from the CEA List Robotics Lab and Alenia Aermacchi (Finmeccanica). In other words, the
overall framing of the document remained in the hands of industry, but the general aim of the
Green Paper is stated as promoting a  “dialog between the law community and the robotics
community” (Leroux, et al, 2012: p.2). Some of the key concerns raised in the document were
further worked out through presentations at the Robolaw kick-off event at the euRobotics
2012  Conference.6 For  example,  one  presentation  attended  to  the  taxonomy  of  robotic
technologies and remarked that these technologies  will  be described in their features and
potential scenarios of employment directly by the researchers who are developing them. Thus,
the focus is aimed at both existing and emerging/envisioned technologies, whereby scenario
methodology is deployed to provide reasonable access to the latter. But, the main idea is that
the actors who develop robotic devices are the ones who also provide descriptions of the
functions of both actual features and scenarios. The resulting taxonomy will then provide the
catalogue of technologies to be studied by legal, philosophical and ethical experts.
This arrangement between engineering and ELS scholarship substantiates our argument that
industry  is  in  fact  dominating  robotics  development.  It  points  to  an  emerging  area  of
uncertainty on how the articulations will be managed between the activities of engineers and
the  activities  of  lawyers  and  other  ELS  experts,7 and  it  complicates  the  involvement  of
academic research communities engaged in robotics. EUROP has been the main platform and
site of robotics innovation. However, as in other ICT and innovation-intensive areas, (see EC
1993, ERT 1998, ISTAG 2001, 2004, Aho 2006), robotics as an innovation domain sits on the
intersections of different societal and expert sectors, to the extent that the manufacture of
robotic devices cannot be disentangled from scientific/academic research, the making of legal
4 It is of course well-known that industry strongly influences EU policies on a number of levels. The 
remarkable thing is the direct approach of actually proposing legislative pre-documents.
5 www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/documents/robolaw_brochure_20120322.pdf
6 www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/documents/RoboLaw_KOM_Odense%205March2012.pdf
7 Furthermore, meetings will be organized in direct connection with civil society. The circulating White Paper 
is projected as the result of interactions between experts in law, ethics, philosophy and robotic engineering, as
well as a “two-ways  communication” with members of the public who can both “contribute to the debate” 
and whose awareness of these issues will thereby be raised.
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frameworks,  the  creation  of  standards,  public  imaginaries  and political  visions  of  how to
create/renew/rescue  Europe.  Politics  and  the  development  of  innovation  policy  are
increasingly infused with technological and industrial visions and, as we strongly suspect, it
goes the other  way around as  well.  Scientific  and technological  visions of  the future are
increasingly pulled by policy makers and politicians armed with a societal agenda.
Reding’s  speech at  the  launching of  EUPOP in  2005 went  into  some technical  detail  on
robotics development and so was clearly informed by specialists working for the Information
Society Technologies (IST) Programme of the European Commission, i.e., its advisory group
ISTAG. This  group is  largely  made  up  of  representatives  from ICT-based  industries  and
academic research, and so not an administrative body, but an expert consultancy which has
advised  the  Commission  for  many  years  on  where  to  put  the  investments  into  the  IST
programmes. Among other things, ISTAG proposed the launching of Ambient Intelligence in
2002 as a strategic research agenda to push European consumer electronics and materials
science forward (Gunnarsdóttir and Arribas-Ayllon, discussion paper). It also proposed the
creation of the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) flagship initiative in 2009, on top of
the existing FET open and FET proactive programmes which were already receiving very
large  sums  of  money  (since  FP6)  to  support  research  into  the  opportunities  afforded  by
technology convergence with ICTs in the pivotal role (European Commission, 2009). ISTAG
even suggested robot companions as one innovation domain that could achieve FET flagship
status, so it is not surprising that one of the contenders became the Robot Companions for
Citizens (RCC) consortium.
According to the European Commission, FET flagships are “ambitious large-scale, science-
driven, research initiatives that aim to achieve a visionary goal” and ”provide a strong and
broad basis for future technological innovation and economic exploitation in a variety of
areas, as well as novel benefits for society” (Cordis website). The RCC consortium, led by the
Scuola Superiore di Sant’Anna in Italy (Prof.  Paolo Dario),  was one of six pilot  projects
funded by the Commission in the run-up to the launch of the flagship programme, of which
two  finally  emerged  as  winners.8 The  consortium came mainly  out  of  the  academically-
oriented EURON, consisting of 73 partners almost exclusively from academic institutions. Its
leader  was  well  situated  at  the  head  of  academic  robotics  research  through  long-time
involvement and leadership in EURON and being advisor to the commission on innovation
policy as member of ISTAG and the co-chair of the 2009 ISTAG report.
As stated in the RCC manifesto and final  proposal,  the visionary goal  was to  master  the
necessary  key-enabling  technologies  in  order  to  begin  designing  and  building  sentient
companion robots with the aim to tackle and solve Europe's societal challenges. We can say
that not all members of this consortium were equally enthusiastic about this goal but,9 while
the final proposal clearly recognised the requirement that a FET flagship ought to be out-of-
the-ordinary visionary, the actual vision they put forward says more about the wider socio-
technical, political and policy landscape in which the RCC consortium emerges.  It is a clear
expression  of  the  kind  of  research  agendas  that  have  become prominent  in  recent  times
(Nordmann  and  Schwartz  2009),  in  which  the  promissory  and  imaginative  capacities  of
8 The Pilots were organised as Coordination Action (CA) projects. Main partners of the RCC CA were: Scuola 
Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant’Anna (SSSA, Italy), Technische Universiteit 
Muenchen (TUM, Germany), Fondazione Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia (IIT, Italy), Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra (UPF, Spain), Karlsruher Institut fuer Technologie (KIT, Germany), Ecole Polytechnique Federale de 
Lausanne (EPFL, Switzerland), Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA, 
France), Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie Van Wetenschappen-Knaw (KNAW, Netherlands), The 
University of Sheffield (USFD, United Kingdom) and University of Patras (UPAT, Greece).
9 From our direct involvement with consortium members.
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technologists draw upon and blend in with societal visions. It is increasingly more difficult to
determine  whether  policy  and  politics  pull  or  push,  while  the  enabling  capacity  of  the
discovery engine,  is  brought  to  bear  on both  nature’s  secrets  and the  envisaged needs  of
citizens. However, under these  conditions of possibility the academically-driven consortium
left  very  little  room for  input  from industry  and its  mediating  function  to  deliver  actual
products to markets. The industry is recognised in the proposal as important and necessary,
but treated almost as an add-on—important but not particularly interesting or relevant. Thus,
the  main  identifier  and basis  for  collective  action  of  the  RCC,  was  the  fascination  with
exploring  and building  objects  that  move,  act,  think and feel  without  a  clear  pathway to
accountability—delivering products  to  market  and societal  goods that  meet  the criteria  of
responsible innovation.
The RCC initiative did not achieve FET flagship status but the consortium still exists as part
of Europe's robotics networks, where industry remains in a leading role. What we learn from
these developments is how complex the networks have become, involving not only one or
another  form of robotics  expertise  but also ELS scholars and policy developers.  Ongoing
developments in robotics, including efforts to regulate the making and remaking of political
and policy visions, takes place within relatively established circuits of knowledge production
and  in  well-organised  networks.  But  as  different  networks  are  brought  into  closer
collaborations and competition, one can also see their differences come into view.
3. The makings of autonomy 
In this section we focus on how industry, science and law have engaged with the makings of
autonomy:  how they  perceive  the  general  challenge  of  robotics  autonomy and  how they
construct their respective visions, goals and strategies in accordance with specific parameters
and norms, enablers and constraints.
3.1. Industry: strengthening growth and competitiveness by opening new markets.
In the robotics roadmap, autonomy is singled out as an application requirement—a detailed
specification of the properties that robots will need to have in the near future:
Autonomy is the system’s ability to independently perform a task, a process or
system  adjustment.  The  level  of  autonomy  can  be  assessed  by  defining  the
necessary  degree  of  human  intervention.  Modern  robots  are  mostly  pre-
programmed. Limited autonomy is present in some domains. In the future robot
systems will perform increasingly complex (sequences of) tasks in decreasingly
well-structured and known environments. Less human instruction or supervision
will be needed over time (EUROP 2009, 22). 
Although  robot  autonomy is  not  the  same  as  human  autonomy  (Haselager  2005),  it  has
something of the same virtual characteristics, a sort of regulative principle or meta-property to
steer actions and strategies. It is not a technical specification of machines; rather, it denotes
the  expansion  and  improvement  of  robot  capabilities,  to  act  independently  from  human
intervention and in new environments and situations. The will to autonomy expresses a wish
within the industries—a  will to expand toward new markets and application areas,  notably
those of assistive robots in a number of domains (care, home, work, disaster areas, etc.). If
robots are to enter these areas of life and work they have to be able to operate on their own;
hence a gradual liberation from humans 'in the loop'.
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This will is grounded in industry's need for competitiveness and growth. As such, industry is
likely to adapt to any major trends and changes in markets and new technologies, which over
the last 20-30 years has been strongly driven toward more automation. For industry, then,
increased autonomy is necessary because it contributes to growth and competitiveness when
automation can be extended into new application areas. The EUROP road map is replete with
prescriptions  for  how  developments  will happen,  for  instance  “robots  and  humans  will
cooperate and share space with each other” (EUROP 2009, 8). Autonomy for robots is thus
conceived of in technologically deterministic terms which is common throughout the history
of technological development (Ellul 1980, Winner 1986, Feenberg 1999, Pinch and Bijker
1987).  However, this determinism resides more in the industry strategy itself in the ways in
which it commands of developments of machines and markets, than in the ways in which
robots work or can be expected to work.
The  theme  of  determinism  and  autonomy  for  technological  entities  comes  with  a  twist.
Developments seem to be pre-determined but the goal is after all to create machines that are
capable of adaptability10 and learning. If this program is successful, robots should be able to
exhibit  greater  degrees  of  non-deterministic  behaviour.  As  stated  in  George  Bekey’s
introduction to  Autonomous Robots (2008)  “[t]here appears to be a contradiction between
autonomy, which implies that a robot is capable of taking care of itself, and control, which
appears to imply some sort of human intervention” (p. 3). The contradiction has practical
implications. The more autonomy one grants to robots, and the more one introduces them to
unpredictable  and  complex  environments,  the  more  difficult  it  becomes  to  control  them.
Whereas  classical  robots  operate  in  closed-off,  insulated  and protected  environments,  the
breaking down of the barriers between machinery and society opens up for much greater
unpredictability. “As these systems become more complex, they are likely to exhibit more and
more unexpected behaviours” (Bekey 2008, 1). The industry vision may be seen therefore, to
be at odds with its own will to control and predict.11 It is clear that the intention is not to
relinquish control but rather to displace or reconfigure the control hierarchies in different,
more dispersed ways. Although robots should integrate with users and society in new ways, it
remains necessary to ensure that “the safety of humans and their general superior position in
the control hierarchy is ensured” (ibid., 9). The question then becomes how the requirements
for increased autonomy are to be squared with requirements for control, which are likely to be
strained as autonomy increases. On a more general level it also becomes a question of how the
control  hierarchy is  to  be structured.  As we will  describe in  the next  section there is  no
specific  strategy for  how to  deal  with this  contradiction.  Rather,  gradual  and incremental
improvements on already existing technologies seem to be the way forward, although, there is
no guarantee that industry will be headed in the desired direction, i.e. to expand the use of
robots to new environments and at the same time retain control.
3.2. Academic research: Robot Companions revealing underlying principles of Nature.
The idea of  Robotic Companions was introduced in various form over some years in EU
policy documents (ISTAG 2004;  Dario et al. 2004, ERCIM 2006, EC 2009, ISTAG 2009).
One can assume therefore that the concept had been nurtured for a while within EU policy
circles  which  then  enabled  the  emergence  of  the  RCC proposal  as  a transformative  new
science based on an understanding of  the most complex machinery known to man: animals
10 Adaptation is thus another application requirement mentioned by the document.
11 Standardisation is thus another “application requirement” which may be seen to (partly) counter the drive 
towards flexibility and adaptability. Standards emerge as central cross-cutting themes across both science, 
technology and legislation. Other “stabilizing” factors are, as we shall return to, the development of legal 
frameworks to stabilize conditions for autonomous robots.
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and living beings. The scientific vision and challenge underpinning the RCC proposal was:
“to  unveil  the  secrets  of  the  embodied  perception,  cognition,  and emotion  of
natural  sentient  systems  that  make  them  capable  of  acting,  interacting  and
adapting  effectively  to  their  physical  and  social  environment  and  of  being
cognizant and sentient of this relationship to the world” (Dario et al. 2011, 50).12
These secrets were comprised of three fundamental design principles underlying the evolution
of bodies and brains:  simplexity,  sentience and  morphological computation.  Together with
Multifunctional Nanomaterials, Energy and  Society a set of scientific principles constituted
the  fundamental  pillars  of  the  proposal  (RCC 2012,  2012b).  Taken  together,  they  would
support  the  “bridge  between  science,  engineering  and  application” (ibid.).  Although  we
cannot go into great depth, we shall provide some more background on these principles:
The  Simplexity pillar  aimed  to  describe  and  understand  solutions  hit  upon  by  organisms
dealing with complex problems. A central idea is that organisms, from the micro-scale over
invertebrates  to  vertebrates,  have  depended  on  a  limited  set  of  cognitive  and  adaptive
mechanisms for their survival and evolution. These mechanisms, the RCC claimed, have been
preserved by evolution,  and can be studied and turned into principles of engineering and
design for robots. Constructing the equivalent of living systems’ brains and nervous systems,
simplexity  would  bring  robotics  beyond  'simplified  model  adaptation'  towards  the
'computational models the nervous system uses'.
Morphological computation. While simplexity is applied in problem-solving, it also closely
coupled with the notion of an embodied cognition. The RCC proposal sought to overcome
long-standing  separation  of  embodiment  and  cognition,  mind  vs  body,  in  robotics  and
artificial intelligence. Central here is the creation and use of new materials capable of low
energy  use,  information  processing  and  computation  in  order  to  achieve  new  physical
properties  for  improved  interaction  with  their  environment  and  better  integration  among
different physical parts. The key is taking into account direct links between embodiment and
information, between embodiment and the wider environment in which a system is embedded.
Overall,  this promotes a view of robots as “complex dynamic systems” (RCC 2012b, 31).
According to  the proposal,  previous separation between the controller  and the controlled,
central to both AI and robotics, can not be upheld. Embodied cognition signifies a shift “from
control to orchestration” (ibid.).
According  to  the  RCC  proposal,  achieving  simplexity and  morphological  computation
combined with major achievements in nano-materials and energy resourcing, will converge in
the design of robots in ways what will bring into being their sentience. Achieving sentience in
machines is the essential feature of the scientific integration promised by the project, i.e., “the
ability to integrate across perception, affect, cognition and action in order to construct one
coherent  scene  and  context  in  which  action  can  be  interpreted,  planned,  generated  and
communicated” (ibid., 32). Through such integration a new type of architecture for robotics
systems is conceived, overcoming the AI and other bottlenecks through the engineering of
12 Clearly, this story could start further back. For instance, research programs in rehabilitation robotics have a 
long history in Europe, and can, at least in the cases of France, Germany, the UK and Scandinavia be traced 
back to the 1970s (Dallaway et al. 1995). Inside the EU structures these initiatives started to come together in
the early 1990s, i.e. with the establishment of the internal market. Dallaway et al. describe how the TIDE 
project ”was set up as a precompetitive technology research and development initiative specifically aimed at 
stimulating the creation of a single market in rehabilitation technology in Europe”. Robot Companions for 
Citizens can thus be seen to be building on such traditions of care robotics, but also as significantly expanded
in scope and vision. Main factors for this expansion has been the merger of robotics with Artificial 
Intelligence and ICTs, in Europe implemented through the program of Ambient Intelligence.   
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more simple and energy-efficient mechanisms, built with smarter and more efficient materials.
Rather than relying on classical top-down control architectures (see for instance Bekey 2008),
sentient  robots  will  be  apt  at  higher  degrees  of  socially  intelligent  interaction,  even
incorporating feelings and affection (RCC 2011). In this sense, sentience provides (at least) a
double response to the paradox of autonomy. On the one hand sentience is intended for more
contextually intelligent and freely operating robots. On the other hand, their propensity to feel
and act more like living beings will make them more reliable, “by virtue of being sentient they
will be dependable machines we can trust” (RCC 2011, 48). 
This biomimetic approach made for a dual strategy. The understanding of mechanisms and
design principles developed by living systems over the course of evolution should feed into
the  engineering  designs  of  artificial  systems.  Through  better  understanding  of  artificial
systems,  RCC researchers  would  also  be  capable  of  reverse  engineering  to  improve  our
understanding of living systems.13 This, it was argued, was not a simplistic linear approach,
but rather one meant to oscillate between the natural and the artificial, and also incorporating
input from the societal/user considered. The result would be a continuous process of techno-
social-scientific discovery, i.e. a 'discovery engine' (RCC 2012b, 37). The experimental back-
and-forth would be a set of experimental platforms, delivering prototype robot applications:
health companion, wearable companion, explore companion, work companion and universal
companion. These experimental platforms would be the concrete sites in which simplexity
and morphological computation could be explored and implemented to ultimately achieve
sentience.
It may be instructive to compare these experimental platforms with the EUROP application
scenarios from 2009. Certain overlaps may be found (i.e. robotic co-workers), however, the
overall picture is one in which the RCC platforms extend far beyond both the EUROP robotic
visions. They are closer to ISTAG on social robotics and/or AI. This positioning is not merely
expressed in terms of the unifying scientific vision by RCC advocates, but also in terms of
social ambition, of creating more sociably apt, i.e.  sentient, robots. The robot companion is
supposed to be 'more than an assistant'  (Dario 2011) and so becomes a yet-to-be realized
societal project in which humans and machine interact in new ways. The scientific principles
of simplexity and morphological computation from which sentence emerges, are also telling
in this respect, since they are meant to displace traditional control architectures and strict
barriers  with  more  socially  situated  and  interactive  robots.  Within  industrial  robotics,
autonomy for robots is mainly a project devoted to the expansion, growth and competitiveness
of industries. In the RCC vision however, the notion of autonomy is matched with a unified
scientific vision and its direct relation with engineering and creation—situating mind as body,
and  the  body  in  evolution  and  nature,  in  ways  that  can  be  technologically  reproduced.
Autonomy emerges more as all the fantastic things that can be done in areas ranging from
basic research (i.e.  neurology,  psychology,  materials  science,  etc.)  through to care for the
elderly or explorations of disaster areas. All members of the RCC consortium did probably not
share the vision of genuinely sentient robots but the common denominator, one can say, was a
fascination with making things that move, think,  feel and act.  Indeed, there are numerous
uncertainties about the vision of sentient robots, all of which are well-known to observers of
robotics and AI.
13 And, in so doing, the RCC project embodied what may perhaps be termed the foundational gap of robotics, 
especially when seen as a way of experimental philosohy aimed at understanding life through its artificial 
recreation: ”Aiming to reenact Creation, at least in part, to produce life or some of its aspects artificially, 
philosophers and engineers have hoped to understand the connection between spirit and body, mind and 
matter, the subjective and objective experiences of life” (Riskin 2007, 1). It is noteworthy that this motivation
sets the RCC apart from the industrial regime to which it is also responding.
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For  example,  doubts  remain  about  general  idea  of  simplexity.  It  is  said  to  reproduce
computational models used by the nervous system, yet introduces the notion that a task can
be phrased as  an abstract  coherent  model  that  takes  place in  a geometric  space.  It  also
introduces minimalism in search for the least complex solution to a given class of tasks, and
that natural systems follow principles to optimise their capabilities and policies. We may thus
ask if  living  systems really  use  computational  models  to  function,  represent  tasks  within
geometrical space, and thereby aim to optimise their capabilities? Do they necessarily choose
the simplest possible solutions? Or, are these perhaps anthropomorphisms introduced by the
researchers themselves?
As concerns morphological computation, the turn towards embodied cognition is also not all
that new. As described by Lucy Suchman, Rodney Brooks introduced the notion of situated
robotics in the 1980s.  Criticisms have been raised about this  paradigm, for instance from
phenomenological  and  hermeneutics  perspectives  (Dreyfus,  1972;  Dreyfus  and  Dreyfus,
1986;  Suchman,  2007;  Robertson,  2002).  Suchman,  quoting  Alison  Adams,  argues  that
Brooks and others recognised the problem of embodiment, but they still did not deal with it in
its  complexity: Brooks reproduces a “bodied individual in a physical environment,  rather
than a socially situated individual” (Suchman 2006, 231).
Taken together, this means that sentience also enters into the tension between autonomy and
control. In the new control hierarchy,  orchestration is supposed to emerge more bottom-up
and situated in embodied intelligence. However, taking embodied intelligence seriously (as
implied by 'soft AI') seems to imply that very specific meanings and functions cannot be given
to principles such as simplexity, but that it rather depends on specific social and ecological
constraints, which are not replicated in engineering principles, hence, the idea that sentience
emerges once all the other design challenges are overcome. However, all such constraints (or
limits) lead to a loss of the scientific rigour that was prescribed by the RCC proposal, and run
the risk of having to fall back on well known approached to AI and mechatronics i.e. the
piece-meal approaches the RCC consortium intended to overcome. 
3.3. Legal : confirming and exploring the promise of autonomous robots
One  way  of  compensating  for  loss  of  technical  predictability  and  control  is  through  the
introduction  of  legal  (and  ethical)  frameworks.  The  problem  was  clearly  stated  in  the
Roboethics Roadmap, issued by the EURON network: “…the increasing autonomy of the
robots could give rise to unpredictable and non predictable behaviours” (Veruggio 2006). The
emergence of robots as new entities that are able to make autonomous decisions is seen as a
challenge of the legal system that will change the legal order and perhaps even result in a
paradigmatic shift in legal thinking (De Cock Buning et al., 2012). This paradigmatic shift in
legal thinking is most typically provoked by the question of legal personhood for artificial
intelligences. This question has already been posed since the rise of computer science, and has
its roots in Alan Turing’s question and test on whether machines can think and can be called
intelligent (Turing, 1950). In the legal field, the question of Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences was first posed by Solum in a seminal article with the same title (Solum, 1992)
and sparked a whole subsequent legal debate. In the texts of the legal partners in the European
networks  of  robotics,  legal  scholars  are  called  upon  to  confront  the  question  of  legal
personhood for robots, since experts are suggesting that artificially intelligent robots may well
become comparable to humans in their faculties of decision. Such developments press upon
legal thought the urge to pose questions about the concept of legal personhood in different
legal fields and how these are challenged. Which are the necessary properties of a civil law
contract  partner?  (Alan  and  Widdison,  1996).  What  is  the  basis  for  the  fact  that  in
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constitutional law humans are legal subjects from birth? (Boyle, 2011, p.6) What kind of a
concept of personhood is involved in the  criminal law on guilt? (Hildebrandt, 2011; Beck,
2009). An important first  emphasis in dealing with such questions is  that the concepts of
“subject”, “subjectivity”, “person” and “personhood” referred to here are not philosophical
concepts, but strictly legal concepts (Stradella et al., 2012). These concepts should not too
readily be taken in an ontological sense that substantiates them. Instead the concept of person
in law is purely a technique that provides a point of imputation of rights and obligations.14
Some  European  Constitutions  recognize  the  personality  principle  as  the  basis  for  the
attribution  of  fundamental  human  rights.15 In  other  Constitutions  the  concept  of  human
dignity, which is also enshrined in article 1 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
forms the basis for this attribution.16 In naturalistic theories, legal personhood is held to be a
natural  feature  that  pertains  exclusively  to  humans  as  natural  persons.  Other  non-human
entities  cannot  be  attributed  any  rights  or  personhoods.  Certain  cases  however,  can  be
distinguished in which legal personhood has been rather treated as a legal status that is also
attributed to other entities. The most obvious case is the legal recognition of the legal person,
a form of limited personhood for corporations as an association of humans.  This  concept
allows  several  different  natural  persons  to  act  as  a  single  entity  that  has  certain  rights,
protections, privileges, responsibilities and liabilities. As such it is thus not directly applicable
to individual entities like robots.17 With Solum, the question could be raised whether artificial
intelligences need to also be attributed human rights. Koops et al. conclude that the attribution
of  culpability  to  robots  in  criminal  law  or  the  attribution  of  (post)human  rights  in
constitutional law does not yet make any sense. They follow Solum in claiming that such an
attribution  would  require  a  degree  of  consciousness  and  intentionality  that  AIs  do  not
possess.18 In the end however, such an attribution has to be an empirical question that will also
have to take into account that robotic entities will challenge these human-centred concepts of
consciousness and intentionality (Koops et al., 2010).
 
Since the attribution of full legal personhood seems out of reach, we can ask whether robots
can be attributed a limited degree of legal personhood that is sufficient for engaging in civil
law transactions like entering into a valid contract.19 Even this is already presented as “a big
step to take” considering that “the impact on society would be radical, since [robots] would
become an active, participating object in (commercial) society (De Cock Buning et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, it is not clear on basis of which criteria legal personhood is acquired here, not
even by humans. In national legislations, law simply attributes legal personhood to  natural
persons and  legal persons.20 In the instruments of international law such provisions do not
even exist. An important question is whether such full legal capacity is required for robots at
all  or whether legal alternatives should be considered. The robot could be qualified as an
14 The legal subject should not be confused with the primary autonomous subject of (Cartesian) philosophy. The
earlier scholastic concept of subiectum iuris actually made reference to an objective sphere as that which is 
the subject of the legal debate, the controversy. Later this notion became supplanted according to a certain 
ideology in legal doctrine by the ‘subjective’ subject of will and autonomy (Thomas, 1998, pp. 97-98). 
Dewey has also argued for distinguishing this specific legal concept of person from the concept of the person 
in everyday speech, psychology or moral philosophy (Dewey, 1926). He states that “even if there is be such 
an ulterior subject per se, it is of no concern of law, since courts can do their work without respect to its 
nature, much less having to settle it” (p. 660).
15 See article 2 of the Italian Constitution. 
16 See article 1 of the German Constitution.
17 In this context we could mention a proposal for a special legal category of electronic personhood for robots – 
the electronic person Ldt. - has been put forward for bundling legal responsibilities of various parties and 
with a financial basis and public registration (Leroux et al., 2012, pp. 60-62). 
18 (Solum, 1992, pp. 1262-1276)
19 See on this issue (Allan & Widdison, 1996).
20 See for instance articles 2:5 and 3:32 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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instrument or extension of the will of its user, so that all acts can be attributed to the latter.
The robot can be qualified as being mandated as an agent employed by its user for concluding
certain transactions, in which case the user is also solely responsible for the actions (chapter 3
of the Principles of European Contract Law). Another possibility is the qualification of the
robot as a minor or as a mentally impaired person who has limited contractual capacity.21 In
this  case the robot would be able  to engage in some kinds of simple transactions,  but is
excluded from other more important transactions (Leroux et al., 2012; De Cock Buning et al.,
2012; Stradella et al., 2012).22 
4. Minding gaps
The  EUROP  2009  roadmap  frames  the  aims  and  objectives  of  strategising  robotics
development in terms of gaps to be filled and challenges to be met. As a research agenda for
the robotics industries, the roadmap is a powerful exercise in assertiveness and industrial will,
but it pushes the road-mapping metaphor to its limits. Scientific and technological challenges
– the detours, alternative pathways and breakthroughs to which they may lead – cannot all be
known in  advance.  Consequently,  some  gaps and  challenges are  unknown and  profound
uncertainties, such as the ones surrounding the making of robot autonomy. More generally,
uncertainties  and  unknowns  indicate  ongoing  tensions  between  ideology  and  practice,
between vision and reality, academic research and industrial production, policy development
and the societal and market relevance of the envisaged breakthroughs within the field.
For example, the 2009 roadmap anticipates the expansion of robotics into new markets and
areas of use. “With increased flexibility and ease of use, robots are at the dawn of a new era,
turning them into ubiquitous helpers to improve our quality  of  life by delivering efficient
services in our homes, offices and public spaces” (2009, p.7). Increasing attention has since
been drawn to societal challenges to better understand what is at stake. It cannot be known in
advance how the new devices will be received. Prospective users may not care enough or feel
that  they  need  autonomous  or  semi-autonomous  machines  for  assistive  purposes  and
companionship. For comparison, the lesson to be learned from experiments in so-called living
labs throughout the 2000s, is how visions of autonomous gadgets and smart environments are
often disconnected from ordinary everyday needs and interests. The stated aim of these labs
are to make user-centred and situatedly realistic designs, however, the research has largely
been preoccupied with discovery of gadgets and services to sell people. As retrospectively
stated by two key visionaries in the field: “…the newly proposed prototypes are still based on
what is known as technology-push, despite new approaches such as user-centric design. They
are still  not  focused at  solving  real  problems and they  are still  too deeply rooted in  the
classical western materialistic needs…” (Aarts and Grotenhuis, 2009, 4).
As far as goes the overall robotics agenda, societal issues and new markets are mostly treated
like conquests. As prescribed by Bischoff et al. (2010), press and media relations must be
taken care of;23 entrepreneurship must be fostered in new areas, markets must be analysed and
appropriate standards and safety measures must be put into place. The agenda is increasingly
infused with social and moral ambitions. After all, if all aspects of life are to be filled with
new robotic helpers and companions, i.e. private, professional and public spheres, then society
at  large  needs  to  actively  collaborated  with  so  that  it  may  accept  the  new  innovation
21 See for instance articles 1:234 and 1:378 BW of the Dutch Civil Code.
22 A robot might more speculatively be taken as an electronic slave without capacity to bear rights or 
obligations, while being able to act in its own name and enter into contracts in its master’s name (Leroux et 
al., 2012).
23 euRobotics thus set up its own press centre in Brussels
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programmes, while boundaries are erected to provide stability, predictability and safety of
autonomous robots. A significant development in this direction is recent mobilisation of legal
expertise by euRobotics, i.e., to have direct impact on legislation and regulation, but ELSi
practitioners were already involved in EUROP early on and ELSi issues were foregrounded in
the 2009 roadmap as  barriers or  obstacles that need to be removed, preferably before they
arise. In short, the work of EUROP and more recently euRobotics recognises that society and
the user are crucial players in illuminating responsibilities, novel uses and new markets, and
so must be featured into strategic push for certain innovation trajectories. However, strategies
to better  understand users,  citizens,  societal  needs and ordinary interests  are  more or less
missing. They tend to be treated as given when the argument is made that advanced robotics
are crucial to solving societal problems—a position which is likely to exacerbate existing gaps
between  robotic  visions  and  societal  interests  and  needs  or,  say,  increase  the  uncertainty
regarding the direction and the purposes for which robotics developments are strategised.
We can further argue that robotics, as a domain of innovation, has always had to manage
blurred and unstable boundaries between visions and what is actually achievable at any given
time. Prevailing visions of artificial autonomy and intelligence have partially come true, but
there is currently no such thing as robot autonomy akin to how we experience and recognise
human autonomy and intelligence. Robot autonomy is always partial and, importantly, it is
always contestable in reference to perceptions of our own. But the fascination with robot
autonomy as an aim in scientific research is a great source of uncertainty and disconnected
from pragmatic priorities of industrial production.
The RCC proposal went to great lengths in the attempt to satisfy the FET flagship requirement
of demonstrating industrial and societal utility. But, the contents of the proposal belong to a
radically different socio-technical universe from that of industry and, in fact, the consortium
barely consulted industry experts. That said, the flagship proposal identifies with a number of
concerns raised in the EUROP 2009 roadmap. For example, it talks about overcoming the
barriers between the operating environments of traditional mechatronic systems and the wider
world of everyday lives. The proposal argues that existing procedures by which robots operate
(navigate,  act,  perceive,  think,  etc.)  must  be  radically  challenged  because  the  gradual
improvements  on  today’s  mechatronic  systems will  not  do  the  job.  Mechatronic  systems
consist of multiple composite parts, and incrementally improving the functionalities of each
single part only adds to, rather than detracts from, existing operational complexities.
In taking this position, the RCC consortium is in clear opposition to dominant thinking within
the industry and responding to a perceived weakness in the EUROP 2009 strategy. Namely,
incremental improvements along existing lines of research24 are not likely to lead to genuine
robot  autonomy,  as  envisaged  by  the  RCC consortium,  but  rather  to  “a  gradual  loss  of
controllability and robustness, and this will ultimately lead to a substantial cost in efficiency
and safety” (RCC 2012, 5). To overcome the limitations of existing systems, the consortium
proposes instead a unified science-based solution by radically re-casting the technoscientific
basis from which machine autonomy is believed to emerge. It promises to bridge the existing
gap  between  today's  and  tomorrow's  robots  through  a  new  and  intensified  merger  of
foundational  science  and  engineering,  thus  breaking  away  from existing  incremental  and
piecemeal  approach.  It  promises  to  provide  industry  with  new  and  more  cost-effective
technologies capable of transgressing many of the limitations of today’s machines.
That  said,  the  academic  research  communities  have  been  seen  by  industry  experts  as
necessary, precisely because of the innovative capacity they demonstrate and the potential
therein  to  foster  the  “integration  of  diverse  technologies  from  a  variety  of  fundamental
24  Recall that euRobotics operated with no less than 66 main technological challenges (Guhl and Zhang 2011).
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domains into one coherent system” (EUROP, 36). They are also seen as necessary because of
their  potential  to  identify  future  markets  and  novel  designs  through  visionary  work  and
experimentation,  although,  successes  are  far  from  inevitable  or  even  probable  in  some
instances. It is in fact well recognised that basic research is long-term and risk-laden, and in
ways in which ordinary product development does not get away with. As stated in EUROP
2009: “Europe cannot afford to only concentrate on areas of strength, it will also need to
foster technologies that could become critical barriers to market” (p.27).
The main purpose of bringing together the two networks EUROP and EURON is to establish
closer links between industry and academic research, “to identify and close the gaps between
industry  and  academia”  (Bischof  et  al.  2010,  729).  A follow  up  document  to  the  2009
roadmap  stated  the  problem  as  follows:  “[R]esearchers  often  believe  that  a  particular
robotics  problem  has  been  solved  for  some  time.  While  these  academic  solutions  are
generally feasible, they may not be sufficient from an industrial point of view” (Bischof et al.
2010, 730). Following this line of argumentation, laments what is seen as the fundamental
discrepancies  between  the  perspectives  of  academic  researchers  versus  those  of  industry
experts. The divisions between them are described in great detail as a set of technical gaps
(Guhl and Zhang 2011), partially evident already in the EUROP 2009 roadmap but later taken
through expert consultations and a ranking of their importance and priority (66 gaps in all)25
These  are  the  obstacles  or  hindrances  that  get  in  the  way  of  the  robotics  community
strategising the expansion of robot capabilities, of discovering novel application areas and
breaking into new markets. But once the gaps have been mapped, the dynamics between the
“market pull of industry” and the “technology push of academic research and development”
can be improved and synergies achieved.26
In  important  ways,  the  RCC  proposal  embodies  experimental  philosophy  aimed  at
understanding life through its artificial recreation. As Riskin puts it,  “[a]iming to re-enact
Creation, at least in part, to produce life or some of its aspects artificially, philosophers and
engineers have hoped to understand the connection between spirit and body, mind and matter,
the subjective and objective experiences of life” (Riskin 2007, 1). This motivation, which was
most forcefully expressed in the proposal, to  uncover the underlying principles of bodies,
minds and brains, sets the RCC consortium far apart from the industrial regime. The proposal
also articulates utopian ideals, a promise of new renaissance for Europe, enabled through the
new unity of science paradigm, a promise of profound social, political and economic utility
which  will  be  ultimately  manifested  in  new robotic  helpers  populating  European  society
(RCC 2012).
Legal scholarship, being inspired by the latest developments, is still grappling with how to
translate between the objectives of basic research, concrete engineering and legal analysis, in
articulating a raster of legal relevancies with gradient and fine enough resolution to actually
impact on legislation and regulation. The methodological approach of creating a taxonomy of
robot abilities is clearly visible in the Green Paper, in which some of the legal analysis is
preceded by an account of state-of-the-art in robot abilities, including scenario-building to
address the R&D challenges of creating future autonomous service robots (RCC, p. 14). The
technological challenges in these scenarios seem clear. They pertain to  sensors, actuators,
computing  systems,  self-localisation,  navigation,  physical  interaction,  non-physical
25 Among the highest ranked gaps we mention 3D mapping, Multi-robot simultaneous localisation and mapping
(SLAM), modelling of human- robot interaction, cooperative navigation and mapping, swarm intelligence 
and human emotion recognition.
26 Proposed measures fall under the general heading of improved ”technology transfer”. Included here is 
initiatives such as education (euRobotics summer school, etc.), part-taking in robot competitions (RoboCup, 
ELROB, FIRA and ICRA robot challenge, etc.) and events  ( … ), and the setting up of a press office in 
Brussels.
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interaction and learning. However, it remains unclear how exactly those kinds of challenges
translate into legal analysis. In fact, the Green Paper recognises how different the disciplinary
terrains  are,  robotics  engineering  and law,  but  how to  bridge  the  gap  between them and
traverse from one terrain to the other is not really articulated in the Green Paper. Rather, the
contributions  of  philosophers  engaged  in  the  shaping  of  robolaw  are  presented  as
investigations,  for example,  into whether human enhancement and overcoming disabilities
through robotics  might  challenge the  distinction  between persons and things,  human and
nonhuman. The articulation of this philosophical work within the legal work is then clarified
by raising a set of questions, singled out for legal treatment. These are questions about the
robot’s legal status, its legal capacity for engaging in legal transactions, and for the allocation
of liabilities for damage in tort and insurance law.
A  fine-grained  analysis  considers  different  kinds  of  robots  capabilities,  proposing
qualifications on a gradient of legal concepts that refer to liability (Boscarato, 2011).27 The
first concerns the question of who is responsible for the damages to things and harm to people
caused by the actions  of a robot.28 It  could be  product liability  for producing a defective
product—the manufacturing or the programming made liable  which is  not much different
from liabilities  for  conventional  machines.  Within  the  traditional  legal  regime of  product
liability for faulty products,29 an injured person has the burden of proof for the damage, the
defect  and the causal  relationship between defect  and damage (article  4),  but  not  for  the
liability of the producer. The robot is considered here a product, a mere physical object. It is
strict liability  for providing a robotic device with erroneous instructions however, users or
owners are made liable,  which is  much the same as the liability of operators of a poorly
managed installation that causes damage or harm (Article VI. 3:206 of the European Civil
Code).  The robot is then qualified as an  installation,  operated as a kind of  instrument.  If
however, the fault liability is for the robotic device taking wrong decisions,30 the robot itself
becomes liable in way that takes robotics devices to different degrees of legal capacity. The
abilities of a robot of locomotion and adaptivity might be relevant to liability for animals
(article VI. 3:203 of the European Civil Code). If it leaves confines of its user or owner and
causes harm or damage, with a little interpretational effort it could be qualified as an animal
but the custodian is still liable. This qualification becomes especially relevant considering that
some robots  are  actually  modelled  after  animals  (as  in  the  bio-mimetic  approach  among
members of the RCC consortium). It is also useful in order to break away from the artefact
qualification towards the qualifications applicable to  adaptive capabilities (Boscarato, 2011,
p. 395). In this sense the legal concept of animal can be taken as a connection point between
the concept of artefact and the concept of (human) person.
To move further  along this  continuum would be the  ability  of  robotic  devices  to  display
decisional cognitive skill and learning capabilities. Artificial neural networks or other learning
systems built to simulate human activity and decision-making, are intended for purposes in
which they should be able to learn new behaviours, not directly commanded by the producer
or programmer. If this kind of machine behaviour then causes damage or harm, the robotic
device may be qualified as a  child  or a  supervised person, including the mentally disabled
(article VI. 3:104 of the European Civil Code). In such cases the supervising party is held
liable  given  that  the  supervision  has  been  deficient.  As  a  legal  qualification  this  code
27   An extract of this analysis constitutes the section on liability in the Green Paper (Leroux et al., 2012).
28  See (Karnow, 1996).
29  Directive 85/374/EC.
30 The legal regime on product liability has been harmonized by the European Product Liability Law Directive 
85/374/EC, that of tort law covering strict and fault liabilities, has not. The project for a common European 
Civil Code however has codifies the principles of European Private Law. See (von Bar, Clive, & Schulte-
Nölke, 2009).
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presupposes a certain degree of agency on part of the legal entity Consequently, the robotic
device is qualified as a person, albeit, one with limited abilities and under supervision while
exhibiting some independence of action.31 In short, a limited form of legal personhood could
be  attributed  to  such  a  robotic  device  (Boscarato,  2011).  This  type  of  gradient  analysis
provides a good example of the making of qualifications so typical for law,32 and provides us
with still another example of gaps to be minded and uncertainties in the makings of robot
autonomy. A range of existing legal concepts appear to suffice in qualifying liabilities that
robotic technologies might raise.33 They only need 'stretching' over to the terrain of various
robotic capabilities. The issue still left open however, is the liability of unsupervised robotic
devices.  Article 3:103 of the European Civil  Code is as far as this exercise goes, placing
robotics  at  best  on  par  with  supervised  and  partially  independent  (human)  persons.
Substituting completely the word  person  for  robot  provides still quite a challenge to legal
qualification which requires more than minimal interpretive effort, and opinions diverge on
this point.
5. Concluding remarks: The politics of uncertainty
 
In this article we have described the main features of recent trends in the development of
robotics in Europe, especially focusing on the makings of autonomous robots. The concept of
makings introduces an intended ambiguity. On the one hand, technologies, artefacts, policies
and different  knowledge-based practices  are  already given in  what  Heidegger  termed the
thrownness  of human existence. On the other hand, projects  and proceedings follow from
such givens (in Heideggarian terms: from facticity), out of which something new is envisioned
and possibly  made. In the making of EU robotics, one may observe how all the actors are
thrown into the project of making more autonomous robots. This premise seems to be a given
—a part  of  a vision shared far  beyond Europe’s borders.  That  vision,  which is  as  old as
robotics itself,  is  grounded in the wish to copy and remake life through the artificial  and
thereby  better  understand  it.  Thus,  it  may  be  appreciated  how,  in  spite  of  the  enormous
resources invested in this, even powerful actors such as the robotics industry are trying to tie
down  and  make  more  concrete  something  that  cannot  be,  because  it  is  based  in  a
(technological) wish or dream. Then, the project is even more ambiguous when we take into
consideration  that  the  age-old  dream is  emboldened  and  projected  onto  the  Europe-wide
political scene, in which it is invested with expectations to rescue and renew Europe's society.
We observe how the actors within this widening field of possibility which is predicated on
diminishing possibilities in other domains (i.e. increasing unemployment, the selling of public
properties, etc.), situate themselves and mobilise the power of the vision. This is especially so
for the industry which has moved fast  and now seems to have secured itself  in the game
through a technology platform and a public-private partnership. But it is also the case for
academic researchers, who find themselves closer to the original dream of making artificial
life with huge resources within close range, for example, FET flagship status.
With respect to the involvement of lawyers, it may at first seem as if there is no substantial
principle or ontology underlying their efforts, and so they are not inclined to take part in the
activities of wishing. At a closer look however,  we observe that members of the robolaw
community  base  their  assumptions  and  future  scenarios  on  the  technical  visions  of
roboticists.
31 On this point see also (Stradella et al., 2012).
32 (Cayla, 1993).
33 The analysis is an example of the use the legal tool of reasoning by analogy in order to apply a previous 
solution from a case in one legal field to another similar case for which no jurisprudence exists.
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As we have described in this paper, each community involved in robotics developments raises
uncertainties and possibly even contradictions. Although this differs from one community to
the other, it seems that for all the variations on the vision of autonomy we have come across,
the  uncertainties  are  intrinsic  to  the  very  logics  of  the  project,  and  not  merely  add-on
considerations or unlucky side-effects. These uncertainties, at which we could only start to
hint in this paper, can be expected to show up with greater force should at least parts of the
autonomous robots dream come true. For example, in the case of industry, this manifests itself
primarily in the control paradox. Increased autonomy comes along with fewer possibilities for
prediction and control, the latter of which is after all a desired outcome within the industry.
Indeed, should appropriate control mechanisms fail to be implemented, issues such as liability
could be expected to increase exponentially. This generates the need for radically up-scaled
efforts, including both increased R&D (and so requiring the contributions of the academic
community),  as well  as the efforts  of legal scholars.  Here,  the project of achieving robot
autonomy  is  connected  growth  and  expansion.  However,  the  possibilities  of  success  are
largely predicated on the needs and perceptions of citizens, and these cannot be known in
advance.  Indeed,  both  within  industry  and  the  academic  communities,  we  observe  how
citizens are imagined along the lines of the classic deficit model (Wynne and Irvin 2002), and
so any expectations of who they are and what they need will most certainly come up against
unforeseen limits. As far as goes for the RCC consortium, their aim at the making of robot
autonomy and sentience has driven the designs toward biomimetic approaches and embodied
cognition. However, the realisation of these visions have been cast in doubt already, i.e., that
we can expect the achievements to come at the expense of (again) control and predictability. 
In the case of legal uncertainties, the problems we already can see do not to pertain to changes
to legal principles as such. The law is flexible and adapts to new circumstances and entities.
The  critical  issues  pertain  to  the  propensities  to  base  legal  reasoning  upon  the  logics  of
scientists and engineers, and the dominant industry rationale (see Jasanoff 1995). By pushing
the  limits  of  legal  reasoning towards  the  speculative,  and towards  anticipations  of  future
events, the unique character of legal practice may ultimately be at stake. Also, should the
Green Paper eventually come to influence EU legislation and policy making, the industry will
have taken further  step into an area in which it  does not  really  belong,  i.e.,  writing law,
although, even Transparency International recognises the basic legitimacy of lobbying and
this lobby is out in the open. An outcome of this, traceable in the Green Paper, is the tendency
towards emphasising the rights and statuses of machines in an evermore automated world,
while  downplaying  the  rights  of  human  beings  intended  to  interact  with  and  use  such
machines. In the view of industry and robotics in general, the main emphasis is on machines,
not humans. 
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